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The occurrence of a moral commi+xnent within a bureaucratic 
7 
setting is not an uncommon phenamenon, especially in our federal 
bureaucratic system. Examples abound, including the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, the Narcotics Bureau; the Selective 
Service Bureau, the,Central Intelligence Agency, the Internal 
Revenue Service, and on a different scale, the Departments of 
State and Justice. In fact, one could argue that some sort of 
moral commitment is necessary for the effective functioning of 
any bureaucratic body. Usually this moral commitment is termed 
i. . " -- 
an "ideology" and is translated into goals for the bureaucracy. 
* 
Anthony Downs suggests four uses for an ideology: 1) to influ- 
ence outsiders to support the bureau or at least not- attack it; 
2) to develop a goal consensus among the bureau.mernbers; 3) to 
facilitate a selective recruitment of staff, that is to attract 
those who will .support. and further the -goals of the -bureau and . 
repel those who would detract from those goals; and 4) to pro- 
vide an alternati.ve in decision making where-other choice 
I -. 
criteria are impractical or ambiguous. 
While most if not all bureaucracies attempt to maintain 
this moral commitment or-ideology for the above mentioned 
reasons, some go further and. initiate moral crusades,'whereby 
they.attempt,to instill this commitment into groups and individ-, 
uals outside their bureaus, The Narcotics Bureau in its efforts 
to mold public and congressional opinion against.drug use is one 
bureaucratic- example, the F,B.I. in its anti-subversive and 
1. Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, Boston: Little Brown, 
1967. 
3 
anti-communist crusades another. The question then becomes, 
* 
under what conditions does this transference of ideology from 
the bureaucracy to its environment or groups within its environ- 
ment take place? Howard S. Becker supplies one answer to this, 
suggesting that this is the work of a "moral entrepreneur", 
either in the role of a crusading reformer or a rule enforcer. 3 
In either role, the moral entrepreneur as an individual takes 
the initiative and generates a "moral enterprise." This explana- 
tion has appeal. It is reminiscent of Weber's charismatic 
leader, and can be used to account for the genesis of most moral 
crusades and entire social movements. Further, it is very 
difficult to refute. A total refutation would not only have to 
indicate an alternative, but also demonstrate that the bureau- 
cratic leader is not a "moral entrepreneur1'--is not a major 
factor in this transference of ideology. The purpose of this 
paper is to accomplish the former only--to provide another 
alternative based upon organizational research and theory which 
is equally if not more persuasive in explaining a moral crusade 
than Becker's individually based "moral entrepreneur" argument. 
The difficulty in separating the two approaches is similar to 
the historian's dilemma of whether the historical incident makes 
the man great or the great man makes the historical incident. 
Here the question becomes: does the moral crusader create the 
2. Fred J. G o k ,  The FBI Nobody Knows, New York: Macmillan, 
1964. 
3. Howard S. Becker, The Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology 
of Deviance, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963 
(especially pp. 147-163). 
morally committed bureaucracy or is he a product of that bureau- 
4 
cracy? 
The difference between the moral entrepreneur approach and 
an approach which attributes the moral crusade primarily to a 
bureaucratic response to environmental fact.0rs.i~ that.in the 
latter instance, moral considerations are secondary to bureau- 
cratic survival and growth, while in the former instance, moral 
considerations are primary. Further, the end results of either 
of these crusades may vary considerably since sach is in response 
to different stimuli. other conditions being equal, the bureau- 
cratic crusade will continue only so long as bureaucratic consid- 
erations dict.ate while the moral crusade will continue so long 
as the individual moral crusader's zealotry requires. 
In this paper, the work of the Bureau of Narcotics and its 
former commissioner, Harry J. Anslinger, are examined in light 
of Becker's conclusion that Anslinger was a moral entrepreneur 
who led his Bureau on a moral crusade against the use of mari- 
huana, culminating in an Anslin.ger-hnstAgated publicity campaign 
that persuaded first the.general public and then Congress that, 
marihuana use was a vicious habit that.should be outlawed and 
severely penalized.4 Given the short time span Becker chose and 
his individualized focus, this seems to be a logical explanation 
of the Bureau's efforts. But given a broader organizational 
perspective, the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act and the Bureau's 
part in that passage appear to be only one phase of a larger 
4, Becker, op, cit., pp. 135-146, 
organizational process, environmental change. Using this focus 
it is necessary first to briefl~~examine the relationships 
between organizations and their environments with specia-l 
emphasis on adaptation and discuss a special case of these 
organizations, the public bureaucracy. The results of this 
analysis are then applied to the Narcotics Bureau and narcotics 
legislation in conjunction with an- examina,tion of Becker's find- 
ings. Finally, the implications of this analysis are examined. 
ORGmIZATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTS 
One on-going problem an organization must cope with is its 
relationship with its environment. For the incipient organiza- 
tion this means an initial decision as to the type of-relation- 
ship it desires, to establish with its environment., an assessment 
of the type of relationship it is able to establish, 'and the 
working-out of some acceptable- compromise between the two. For 
the established organization, this means maintaining this rela- 
tionship elther through normal boundary defenses or through other 
i 
means, or establishing a- more .favorable.one.. The. consequences 
of these--dec~sion,~assessment, and.compromise--for the.organiza- 
tion are far reaching, for if the organization wishes to grow 
and expand, or -even .continue. to exist, . it must come, to terms 
5. See especially Peter M. Blau and W.'Richard Scott, Formal 
Organizations: A Comparative Approach, San Francisco: 
Chandler Publishing Company, 1962, pp. 222-254; William H. 
Starbuck, "Organizational Growth and Development" in James 
G. March (ed), Handbook of Organizations, Chicago: Rand 
McNally & Co., 1965, pp. 450-533; and Phillip Selznick, 
TVA and the Grass ~oots: A Case Study in the Sociology of 
Formal Organizations, Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1949. 
with its environment and where necessary insure acceptance by 
it. No doubt a few organizations with substantial resources 
may exist for some time in a hostile environment, but the more 
normal case seems to be that an organization must at least 
establish as environment.ally neutral relationship if not an 
environmenta1,ly supportive one. 
Of course when the organization is in its incipient stages, 
the problems are magnified. Environmental support is more nec- 
essary, environmental hostility more of a threat to survival. 
Usually the organization will adapt to the demands of the environ- 
ment, but occasionally Starbuck's observation "Adaptation is an 
obvious preconditi.on of survivalu6 is ignored and the organiza- 
tion either chooses to attempt to alter these demands or chooses 
to ignore them. Not uncommonly such a decision results in 
drastic consequences for the organization. The W.C.T.U. failed 
in its efforts to gain wide acceptance for its programs and has 
only been able 'o continue with its operations severely cur- 
tailed. The counseling organization at Western Electric that 
grew out of,the Hawthorne Studies felt it could not function 
properly if it adapted to the requirements of the larger organ- 
ization and was eventually discontinued, though adapation was 
part of a more complex problem. 
7 
6. W. Starbuck, op. cit., in March (ed), Handbook of organiza- 
tions, p. 468. 
7, William J. Dickson and F. J. Roethlisberger, .Counseling in 
an Organization: A Sequal to the Hawthorne Researches, 
Boston: Division of Research, Harvard Business School, 
1966, Chapters XIV and XVI. 
An organization may attempt to alter the demands of its 
environment when such an attempt would not draw too heavily 
upon the-organization's resources, -or when the alternative, 
adaptation to the environment, would mean a substantial loss 
to the organization or perhaps dissolution. Selznick's study 
of the TVA and Clark's study of adult education in California 
are examples of organizations which chose to try to alter their 
environments rather than adapt to them. In Selznick's case, 
the organization itself was altered by its own efforts. Clark 
argues that a number of organizations undergoing a similar 
value transformation may alter the values of the soc.iety in- 
which they exist. He focuses on what-he calls "precarious 
values" and discusses under what conditions these may be changed. 
It is clear then that some attempts to alter the environ- 
ment succeed, others fail. Why is this so? An organization's 
envrionment may be very simple or highly complex, but in 
general every environment when viewed as,a system will contain 
the following elements: 1) pragmatic day-to-day decisions 
categorized as policies or practices; 2). long range goals; 
3) a clearly defined normative system; and 4) a generalized 
value system. 
9 
8. Selznick, OD. cit.; Burton Clark, "Oraanizational Ada~ta- - 2 . 
tion and Precarious Values, .Arneri.can Sociological Review, 
21 (l956), pp. 327-336. 
9. - Adapted from Talcott Parsons, ."An Outdine of the Social 
System,'! in Talcott Parsons, Edward Shils, Kasper D. 
Nazele and Jesse N. Pitts (eds), Theories'of Society: 
Foundations of Modern Sociological Theory; New York: The 
Free Press of Glencoe, Volume I, pp.'30-79. 
If placed in a hierarchy in this order, each succeeding 
category would influence its predecessors. That is, values in 
the environment are in part the basis of the other three, 
norms influence both goals and policies and practices, and so 
forth. Further, any member of any category may be strongly or 
weakly held. Sqme of the reasons for weakness are outlined by 
Clark--that is, not legitimated,-undefined, or not widely 
accepted. 10 
Any organization that chooses to alter its environment will 
have to make a decision as to where along the.hierarchy. to focus. 
its efforts. Attempts to alter some pol&cy of an environmental 
element may be more successful and less costly than attempts to 
alter some value of an environment, but the latter might result 
in a long-term change while the former,might be the more stable 
since the goals, norms and values underlying it were not changed., 
A change in the value system, where-possible, would eventually 
result in changes throughout the system. 
It would seem that organizational attempts at environmental 
change will depend upon a number of factors: 
(a) .the necessity for change---is environmental change 
a prerequisite for organizational- survival, or 
is it not necessary, merely desirable?.. 
(b) the amount of resources available--can the organ- 
ization afford to attempt the change effort? - 
(c) the size and complexity, of the environment.--would 
change be necessary' in only a ,small. element in. 
the environment, or would..a whole complex of 
elements need to be a'ltered? . 
10. Clark, .ope cit., -pp. 328-329. 
(d) the extent to.which change must take place--is it 
necessary to change only some environment policy 
or practice, or is it necessary to, totally revamp 
the environmental structure from values on down? 
- .  
(e) is the policy, goal, norm or value to be changed 
strongly or weakly held--is it firmly entrenched 
and legitimated, or is it "precarious"? 
It is clear, then,.that when pne is talking.about organiza- 
tions changing their-environment, -.one should-make explicit wha-t 
elements in the.envi.ronment are-being focused upon, how exten--- 
siyely they are.being changed-and how strongly held they were to 
begin-with. Clark" .adult education study was concerned with 
weakly-held values. The W.C.T.U. as-discussed by Gusfield was 
concerned with strongly-held values, and this may in some degree 
account for its failure. l1 Becker, in his discussion of the 
Marihuana Tax Act as a "moral enterprise" was concerned ,with a 
weakly-held value, as will be shown, though he did not discuss 
it in these terms. 
A CASE STUDY: THE U.S. NARCOTICS BUREAU 
The Narcotics Bureau as a Public Bureaucracy. 
This case study will be 1imite.d to an analysis of the 
policies of the Narcotics Bureau and the effects.of these 
policies on salient elements of its environment. This approach 
is preferable to a-more general organizational analysis of the 
Bureau, examining its structure, recruitment, boundary defenses 
and its myrid environmental transactions, because in these, 
11. Joseph R. Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade:-. Status':Politics and 
the American Temperance Movement.; Urbana,: University o-f. 
Illinojs Press, 1963; 
. .. 
respects, the Bureau is not unlike most.otker governmentai 
. . . . . _ .  
, <...* 
bureaucraciss. Further, in its efforts to mold public opinion 
in support of its,policies it is not unlike many organizations, 
especially those with a moral~commitment. The W.C.T.U. carrie.d 
. . 
. - 
out-the same sort of campaign, including propaganda, attacks 
on its critics and legislative lobbying. what makes the Bureau 
unique from many other organizations which have tr.ied to influ- 
ence their environments is-that.the campaign was and is carried 
out by a governmental organ. 
.& . , Several- ramifications of this*differepce are Ammediately 
apparent. There is the element of 'legitimation--the public is 
. . . . : .  :,.$?'.. ,. . - 
r::. ! 
. 
far more likely to accept the pronouncements of a ,federal depart- 
. . r / 
ment khan a voluntary pri'vate organization. ,#-There is the 
element of propaganda development--due to its public nature, a 
federal department is more skilled in dealing with the public 
and preparing propaganda for public consumption. There is the 
element.of communication--a federal organization has far more 
means available for the dissemination of the information than 
. . .  
. .  . . .  a private . cne, by press releases, publications, 'or lectures and . . .  . 
. . , . L ' . ,  . . . . . .  . . . .  . . . . . .  . .  . 
speeches, a i d  i s  likely ' to have : representatives' based in major 
population centers to .disseminate the information. There is, 
the element of coercion--a federal department can bring a wide 
range of pressures to bear on its critics.. 
Finally, at a different level, a federa1.burea.u differs in 
the area of survival.' Private organizations have consideqable 
control over their future.   hey may decide to expand, cqntinue 
. . -. - . . -- I . . 
as before, disband, merge, alter their aims or rGduce.thelr 
* .  
. r 
a c t i v i t i e s .  The a t t i t u d e  of t h e i r  .environments w i l l  have g r e a t  
b e a r i n g  on t h i s  d e c i s i o n ,  t o  be  s u r e ,  b u t  t h e  f i n a l  d e c i s i o n  
rests w i t h  t h e  organ,j.zation. A f e d e r a l  depar tment  may go 
through any of t h e  above s t a g e s ,  b u t  f r e q u e n t l y ,  t h e  f i n a l  dec i -  
s i o n  does  n o t  r e s t  w i t h i n  t h e  depar tment ,  b u t  w i t h  t h e  'congres- 
s i o n a l ,  e x e c u t i v e  o r  j u d i c i a l  body t h a t  c r e a t e d  it. A bureau 
c r e a t e d  by c o n g r e s s i o n a l  enactment w i . 1 1  con t inue  t o  be u n a l t e r e d  
e x c e p t  by i n t e r n a l  d e c i s i o n  on ly  a s  long  a s  Congress can be 
convinced t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no need t o  a l t e r  it. Although there -may 
be some q u e s t i o n  of deg ree ,  t h e r e  i s  no q u e s t i o n  t h a t  p u b l i c  
op in ion  w i l l  be a  major f a c t o r  i n  t h e  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  d e c i s i o n .  
i. 
There fo re ,  t h e  f e d e r a l  depar tment  must convinde t h e  p u b l i c  
and Congress:  1) t h a t  i t  s e r v e s  a  u s e f u l ,  o r  i f  p o s s i b l e ,  a  
neces sa ry  f u n c t i o n ;  and 2 )  t h a t  it i s  unique ly  q u a l i f i e d  t o  do 
s o .  The l e s s  t h e  department i s  s u r e  o f  i t s  f u t u r e  s t a t u s ,  t h e  
more i t  w i l l  t r y  t o  convince Congress and t h e  p u b l i c  of  t h e s e .  
Background t o  Environmental Change: The Emergence and 
Development of t h e  Bureau. 
I n  t h e  l a t e  n i n e t e e n t h  and e a r l y  t w e n t i e t h  c e n t u r i e s ,  nar-  
c o t i c s  were widely  a v a i l a b l e ,  through d o c t o r s  who i n d i s c r i m i -  
n a t e l y  p r e s c r i b e d  morphine and l a te r  h e r o i n  a s  pa in  k i l l e r s ,  
through d r u g g i s t s  who s o l d  them open ly ,  o r  through a  wide 
v a r i e t y  of  p a t e n t  medicines.  
The p u b l i c  ... ( i n  t h e  e a r l y  t w e n t i e t h  c e n t u r y )  had 
an a l t o g e t h e r  d i f f e r e n t  concept ion  of drug a d d i c t i o n  
from t h a t  which p r e v a i l s  today.  The h a b i t  was n o t  
approved,  b u t  n e i t h e r  was it regarded  a s  c r i m i n a l  o r  
monstrous.  I t  was u s u a l l y  looked upon .as  a  v i c e  o r  
p e r s o n a l  mi s fo r tune ,  o r  much a s  a lcohol i sm i s  viewed 
today.  Narcotics u s e r s  were p i t i e d  r a t h e r  than  
l o a t h e d  a s  c r i m i n a i s  o r  degene ra t e s  ,... 112 
I n  1914,  Congress through t h e  passage  of  t h e  Haxrison 
Act a t t empted  t o  e x e r t  sqme c o n t r o l  o v e r  t h e  n a r c o t i c s  t r a f f i c .  
Th i s  a c t  remains today t h e  c o r n e r s t o n e  o f  n a r c o t i c s  l e g i s l a - 3  
t i o n .  Ra ther  t h a n  e l i m i n a t e  t h e  u s e  of  n a r c o t i c  d rugs ,  t h e  a c t  
was passed  i n  o r d e r  t o  honor a . ,previous  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o b l i g a t i o n  
stemming from t h e  Hague Convention o f  1912, and t o  c o n t r o l  t h e  
c r i m i n a l  encroachments i n t o  t h e  drug  t r a d e .  Nowhere i n  t h e  a c t  
i s  t h e r e  d i r e c t  r e f e r e n c e  t o  a d d i c t s  o r  a d d i c t i o n .  
I ts  o s t e n s i b l e  purpose appeared  t o  be  simply t o  
make t h e  e n t i r e  p roces s  of d rug  d i s t r i b u t i o n  w i t h i n  
t h e  coun t ry  a  m a t t e r  of  r eco rd .  The  nominal e x c i s e  
t a x  (one c e n t  p e r  o u n c e ) ,  t h e  r equ i r emen t  t h a t  
pe r sons  and f i r m s  hand l ing  drugs  r e g i s t e r  and pay 
f e e s ,  a l l  seemed des igned  t o  accomplish  t h i s  purpose.  
There i s  no i n d i c a t i o n  of a  l e g i s l a t i v e  i n t e n t i o n  t o  
deny a d d i c t s  a c c e s s  t o  l e g a l  d rugs  o r  t o  i n t e r f e r e  i n  
any way w i t h  medical  p r a c t i c e s  i n  t h i s  a rea .13  
Medical  p r a c t i c e s  were s p e c i f i c a l l y  exempted: 
Nothing con ta ined  i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  .,. s h a l l  .,. apply  ... 
( t ) o  t h e  d i s p e n s i n g  o r  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  any drugs  
ment ioned . . . to  a  p a t i e n t  by a  p h y s i c i a n ,  d e n t i s t ,  o r  
v e t e r i n a r y  surgeon r e g i s t e r e d  under s e c t i o n  4722 i n  
. t h e  cou r se  of  h i s  p r o f e s s i o n a l  p r a c t i c e  only .14 
. . 
12. A l f r e d  R. Lindesmith ,  Op ia t e  Add ic t ion ,  Bloomington, Ind.: 
P r i n c i p i a  P r e s s ,  1947, p. 183. . . .  .. . .., , 
13. A l f r e d  R e  Lindesmith ,  The Addic t  and t h e  Law, Bfoamington, 
I n d . :  1ndiana  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1965, p. 4 .  See a l s o  
Rufus King, "The Narco t i c s  Bureau and t h e  ~ a r r i s o n  Act: 
J a i l i n s  t h e  Healers and t h e  S i c k , "  6 2  Yale Law J o u r n a l .  
736 ( 1 5 5 3 ~  and Wil l iam B.  ~ l d r i g e ,  ~ a r c o t i c s  and the ' 
Law, N e w  York: The American B a r  Foundat ion,  1961. The 
-- 
Act i s  p l aced  i n  a  s t a t u t o r y  p e r s p e c t i v e  i n  "Note: Narcot- 
i c s  Regu la t ion , "  6 2  Yale Law J o u r n a l ,  (3953b, pp. 351-787. 
1 4 .  26 U.S.C.  4705 (c)  (1954 Code).  
Thus, t h e  a c t  d i d  n o t  mske a d d i c t i o n  i l l e g a l .  A 1 1  it 
r e q u i r e d  was t h a t  a d d i c t s  should o b t a i n  drugs  from r e g i s t e r e d  
p h y s i c i a n s  who made a  r eco rd  o f  t h e  t r a n s a c t i o n .  
A n a r c o t i c s  d l v i s i o n  was c r e a t e d  i n  t h e  I n t e r n a l  Revenue 
Bureau of t h e  Treasury  Department t o  c o l l e c t  revenue and en fo rce  
t h e  Har r l son  Act.  I n  1 9 2 0 ,  it merged i n t o  t h e  P r o h i b i t i o n  Unit  
of t h a t  depar tment ,  and upon i t s - c r e a t ~ o n  i n  1927 i n t o  t h e  
P r o h i b i t i o n  Bureau, I n  1930, t h e  Bureau of  Narco t i c s  was formed 
a s  a  s e p a r a t e  Bureau i n  t h e  Treasury Department, 
Leg i t ima t ion :  The Process  of  Changing an Environment. 
A f t e r  1 9 1 4 ,  t h e  powers of t h e  N a r c o t i c s  D iv i s ion  were c l e a r -  
and l i m i t e d :  t o  e n f o r c e  r e g i s t r a t i o n  and record-keeping,  v i o l a -  . 
t i o n  of  which could  r e s u l t  i n  imprisonment f o r  up t o . t e n  y e a r s ,  
and t o  s u p e r v i s e  revenue ,collect i .om, The l a r g e  number o f  a d d i c t s  
who secured  t h e i r  d rugs  from p h y s i c i a n s  w e r e  excluded ffom t h e .  
D i v i s i o n ' s  j u r i s d i c t i o n .  The p u b 1 i . c " ~  a t t i t u d e  toward ,drug use 
had n o t  changed much w i t h  t h e  passage  o f  t h e  Act-- there  w a s  some,  
o p p o s i t i o n  t o  drug u s e ,  .some suppor t  of i t ,  and a - g r e a t  many who 
d i d  n o t  c a r e  one way o r  t h e  o t h e r :  I n  f a c t  t h e  Har r i son  Act was 
15 passed w i t h  ve ry  l i t t . l e , p u b l i c i t y  o r  news 'coverage. . 
15. The ~ e w  York T i m e s  Index f o r  1 9 1 4  l i s t s  on ly  two b r i e f  
a r t i c l e s  on t h e  f e d e r a l  legislation, one i n  June and one 
i n  August when t h e ' s e n a t e  adopted t h e  Act .  1 t . s h o u l d  be 
no ted  t h a t  t h e r e  was a l s o  discussion of  a broadened N e w  
York S t a t e  n a r c o t i c s  a c t  and a r t i c l e s  p u b l i c i z i n g  t h e  
a r r e s t  of  v i o l a t o r s  of an e a r l i e r  New York s t a t u t e  a t  
t h a t  t i m e .  
Thus at this time, the Narcotics Division was faced with a 
severely restricted scope of operations. Acceptance of the 
legislation as envisioned by Congress would mean that the 
Division would at best continue as a marginal operation with 
limited enforcement duties. Given the normal, well-documented 
bureaucratic tendency toward growth and expansion, and given the 
fact that the Division was a public bureaucracy and needed to 
justify its operations and usefulness bef~re Congress, it would 
seem that increased power and jurisdiction in the area of drug 
control would be a desirable, and in fact, necessary goal. 
Adaptation to the Harrison Act limitations would preclude 
attainment of this goal. Operating under a legislative mandate, 
the logical alternative to adaptation would be to persuade the 
Congress and public that expansion was necessary and to extend 
the provisions of the Harrison Act,. 
Also at this point, the public's attitude toward narcotics 
use could be characterized as only slightly opposed. Faced with 
a situation where adaptation to the existing legislation was 
bureaucratically unfeasible, where expansion was desirable, and 
where environmental support--support by both Congress and the 
public--was necessary for continued existence, the Division 
launched a two-pronged campaign, one a barrage of reports and 
newspaper articles which generated a substantial public outcry 
against narcotics use, and the other a series of Division- 
sponsored test cases in the courts which resulted in a re- 
inter~retation of the Harrision Act and substantially broadened 
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powers for the Narcotics Division. l6 Thus the Division attained 
its goals by effecting an alteration of a weakly-held public 
value on-narcotics use from neutrality or-.slight opposition to 
strong opposition, and by persuading the courts that it should 
have increased powers. .17 
Though the resources of the Division were limited,-it was 
able to accomplish its.goals because it was a public bureaucracy, 
and as such had the aforementioned advantages which arise from 
that status. Since the ability to develop propaganda and the 
means to communicate it were inherent in this status, as was the 
propensity by the public to accept this propaganda, environmental 
support could be generated with less resource expenditure. 
Further, the Division as a public bureaucracy would be.assumed 
to ,have a familiarity with governmental. processes not only in.its 
own executive branch,.but also in the congressional and judicial. 
branches as well. This built-in expertise, necessary for the 
Division's expansion, might.be quite costly in time and resources 
for,the private bureaucracy but again was inherent in the 
Division's status. 
16. King;op. cit., pp. 737-748, Lindesmith, The ~ddict ..., 
op. cit., pp. 5-11.. 
17. Why a judicial expansion of existing legislation was 
preferred over further Congressional action is not clear, 
but one can probably assume that it was decided the former 
would involve fewer resources or was more of a certainty. 
In so doing, the Division was able to finesse lobbies of 
doctors'and pharmacists who strongly opposed the Harrison 
Act and lobbied for the medical exception. (See the New -
York Times, June 28, 1914, Sec. 11, p. 5.) 
One t y p i c a l  example of t h e  p u b l i c  campaign was a  r e p o r t  
c i t e d  and r e l i e d  upon by t h e  N a r c o t i c s  D iv i s ion  f o r  some yea r s .  
I t  i s  an i n t e r e s t i n g  combination of  t r u t h ,  s p e c u l a t i o n  and 
f i c t i o n ,  a  mix which t h e  D iv i s ion  and t h e  Bureau which succeeded 
it found t o  be  an e f f e c t i v e  p u b l i c  pe r suade r  f o r  many y e a r s .  I n  
a r e p o r t  d a t e d  June ,  1919, a  committee appoin ted  by t h e  Treasury 
Department t o  s tudy  n a r c o t i c s  r e p o r t e d  i n t e r  a l i a  t h a t  t h e r e  were 
237,665 a d d i c t s  i n  t h e  United S t a t e s  t r e a t e d  by p h y s i c i a n s  (based 
upon a t h i r t y  p e r  c e n t  response  by p h y s i c i a n s  q u e r i e d ) ,  t h a t  
t h e r e  w e r e  ove r  one m i l l i o n  a d d i c t s  i n  t h e  count ry  i n  1919 ( a  
f i g u r e  based upon a  compromise between p r o j e c t i o n s  based on t h e  
pe rcen tage  of  a d d i c t s  i n  J a c k s o n v i l l e ,  F l o r i d a  i n  1913 and New 
York C i t y  i n  1918) ,  t h a t  t h e r e  was e x t e n s i v e  a d d i c t i o n  among 
c h i l d r e n ,  t h a t  n a r c o t i c s  were harmful  t o  h e a l t h  and mora l s ,  and 
t h a t  t hey  were d i r e c t l y  connected w i t h  cr ime and a b j e c t  pover ty .  
Among t h e  p h y s i c a l  e f f e c t s  no ted  w e r e  s t e r i l i t y ,  d i s e a s e d  lungs ,  
h e a r t s  and k idneys ,  r o t t i n g  of  t h e  s k i n  and i n s a n i t y .  18 
The " s c h o l a r l y  r e p o r t "  i s  an i n t e r e s t i n g  example of  t h e  
propaganda e f f o r t ,  f o r  it appears  t o  t h e  c a s u a l  r e a d e r  t o  be  
c r e d i b l e  ( e s p e c i a l l y  g iven  i t s  s o u r c e ) ,  and c o n t a i n s  charges  
which seem t o  be des igned  t o  g e n e r a t e  widespread p u b l i c  d i s -  
g u s t  toward n a r c o t i c s  u s e r s  and s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  D iv i s ion  and 
i t s  e f f o r t s .  Many of  t h e  same cha rges  were a p p l i e d  t o  marihuana 
when t h e  Bureau campaigned a g a i n s t  i t s  use .  
18.  U.S. Treasury Department, Repor t ,  of S p e c i a l  Committee t o  
I n v e s t i g a t e  t h e  T r a f f i c  i n  N a r c o t i c  Drugs, ( A p r i l  1 5 ,  
1919) .  
While the Division was carrying out its public campaign, 
it was also busy in the courts. Between 1918 and 1921, the 
Narcotics Division won three important cases in the Supreme 
Court and persuaded the Court essentially to delete the 
medical exception from the Harrison Act, thereby broadening 
its position as an enforcement agency. In the first case, 
Webb v. U.S. ,19 the court held that a physician could not supply 
narcotics to an addict unless he,was attempting to cure him, 
and in so doing made illegal the work of a large number of 
physicians who were-supplying addicts with drugs under the 
registration procedures of the Harrison.Act. This decision was 
supported in the two following cases, Jin Fuey Moy v. U.S. 20 
and U.S. v. Behrman. 21 In Behrman, it was held that physicians 
could not evensupply drugs to addicts in an attempt to cure them. 
The medical exception was nullified. The cases were skillfully 
chosen and presented to .the court. Each was a flagrant abuse 
of the statute--in Webb, the physician's professional practice 
seemed to be limited to supplying narcotics in whoever wanted 
them.. In.the other two cases; the physicians supplied huge 
amounts of drugs over short periods of time to a small number 
of patients--patently for resale at a later time. : Yet the 
Division did not aigue for and the court did not rule on the 
19. 249 U.S. 96 (1918) 
. . 
20. 254 U.S. 189 (1920) 
21. 258 U.S.. 280 (1921) 
cases as violations of the.statute as it was.intended, but 
instead regarded.al1 of these, as normal prof.essiona1 practices 
by-physicians and held that as such, they were illegal. 
Three years after Behrman, the court somewhat reversed 
itself in Linder v. U.S. 22 Here the doctor supplied a small 
dosage to a patient who was a government informer. The court 
rejected the government's case in a unanimous opinion,~holding: 
The enactment under consideration ... says nothing 
of "addicts" and does not undertake to prescribe 
methods for their medical treatment, and we cannot 
possibly conclude that a physician acted improperly 
or unwisely or for other than medical purposes solely 
because he has dispensed to one of them, in the 
ordinary course and in good faith, four small tablets 
of morphine or cocaine for relief of condition inci- 
dent to addiction. 23 
The court went on to warn the,Division: 
Federal power is delegated, and its prescribed 
limits must not be transcended even though the ends 
seem desirable. The unfortunate condition of the 
recipient certainly created no reasonable probability 
that she would sell or otherwise dispose of the few 
tablets entrusted to her and we cannot say that by so 
dispensing them the doctor necessarily transcended 
the limits of that professional conduct with which 
Congress never intended to interfere.24 
Though Linder might have reintroduced doctors into the 
area, the Narcotics Division successfully prevented this by 
refusing to recognize Linder in its regulations, .thus making 
a situation where few would accept the risks involved in 
testing,the doctrine, .and by launching an all-o.ut campaign 
22. 268 U.S. 5 (1924) -
23. 268 U.S. 5 at 15 (1924) -
24. 268 U.S. 5 at 20 (1924) 
against doctors--closing the remaining narcotics clinics,. 
imprisoning rebellious doctors, and publicizing records and 
convictions of physician addicts. 
25 
Rufus King comments on this ,period of ,growth: 
In sum, the Narcotics Division succeeded in creat- 
ing a very large criminal class for itself to 
police ... instead of the very small one Congress 
had intended. 
The success of this.campaign-was reflected not only in 
the increased number of potential criminals, but in financial 
. . 
growth as well. Between 1918 and 1925, the Bureau's budgetary 
appropriations increased from $325,0,00 to $1,329,440, a rise 
of over 400 per cent. 27 
The Marihuana Tax Act of 1937: A Bureaucratic Response. 
There are many other examples of efforts by the Bureau 
to create and maintain a friendly and supportive environment, 
through other publicity campaigns, through lobbying in Congress 
and through continued and diligent attacks upon and harass- 
ments of its critics which have been amply chronicled by others, 
25. King, op. cit., pp. 744-745; "Note: Narcotics Regulation," 
op. c+t.,:pp. 784-787. The Bureau's yearly report Traffic 
In Oplum and Other Dangerous Druqs.carries numerous re- 
ports on addiction among physicians during this period. 
- 
See also Lindesmith, The Addict ..., op. cit., pp. ,135-161, 
26. King, .op. cit. , p. 738. 
27. See.Table 1;p. 21. During this period;. ..two pieces of 
legislation were enacted that affected the Bureau's scope 
of operation: The Revenue Act of 1918, and the Narcotic 
Drug Import and Export Act of 1922. . 
though not as part of an organizational process. 
28 
The Bureau's efforts to induce passage of the Marihuana Tax 
Act deserve special mention, however, in light of Beckerfs find- 
ings that the legislation was the.result of what he,terms a 
"moral enterprise. " 2.9 Becker concludes that Narcotics Commis- 
sioner Anslinger.and his Bureau were the motive forces behind 
the-,or,iginal,1937 legislation and the increasingly: severe penal- 
ities which have since been imposed.. This is readily conceded. 
30 
But he argues that the moti.vation behind this desire for the 
marihuana legislation was a moral one. He presents a picture of 
a society totally indifferent to.the use. of-marihuana until 
Ans1inger;in the role of a moral entrepreneur, "blows the 
whistle" on marihuana smoking. Again, it is.conceded -that Com- 
missioner A n s l i n g e r . t h r o u g h o u t . h i s  long career with the Narcotics 
Bureau has opposed drug and narcotics use on moral grounds. This 
28 .  Along with the works of Lindesmith and King, supra, see the 
Bureau of Narcotics publication, Comments on Narcotic 
Drugs (undated), the Bureau's reply to the A.B.A.-A.M.A. 
committee interim report "Narcotic Drugs". This publication, 
which was described by DeMott as "perhaps the crudest 
publication yet produced by a government agency" (Benjamin 
DeMott, .-"The Great Narcotics Muddle, " Harpers ~a~azine, . 
March, 1962, p. 53), was later taken out of print. For a 
vivid account- of the Bureau's methods with its critics, 
see Lindesmith, The Addict ..., op. cit., pp. 242-268 .  . 
30. 1t.seems .clear from examining periodicals, newspapers and 
the Congressional Record that the Bureau'was primarily 
responsible for the passage of the ac.t, though Becker's 
almost exclusive reliance on the claims of the Bureau in 
its official publication Traffic in Opium and Other Danger- 
ous Drugs does not seem warranted given the previously 
discussed tendency of a.public bureaucracy to emphasize.its 
necessity and successful functioning. 
theme runs consistently through his writings. 31 What Becker 
ignores is that Anslinger was also a bureaucrat, .and thus respon- 
sive to'bureaucratic pressures and demands as well. The dis- 
tinction between these roles is difficult to make, but it is 
fundamenta1,in analyzing the legislation. 
To understand whether the marihuana legislation was to a 
large degree the result of.bureaucratic.processes similar to the 
Bureau's expansion after the Harrison.Act or whether it was 
instead the result of an individual's moral crusade, .it-is nec- 
esarry to focus not only on the individual as Becker has done, 
but upon the Bureau and its environment during this period. 
Through this method, certain parallels with the post-Harrison 
Act period become evident. 
The Marihuana,Tax Act which imposed a prohibitively costly 
tax on the sale of marihuana was passed by both houses of-Congress 
31. See es~eciallv Harrv Anslinser-and Will Osborne. The -
~urderers: ~ k e  stoEy of the Narcotic Gang, ~ew'york: 
Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1961, Chapter I, and also the 
other writings of the Commissioner, inter alia Harry 
Anslinger and William F. Tompkins, The Traffic in Nar- 
cotics, New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1953, and Harry 
Anslinger and J. Gregory, The Protectors: The Heroic 
Story of the Narcotics Agents, Citizens, and Officials 
in Their Unendina. Unsuna Battle Asainst Oraanized Crime 
in America, New Gork: ~arrar, ~traus, ,1964: 
. 
with practically no debate3* and signed into law on August 2, 
1937. While Becker seems to argue that the Bureau generated a 
great public outcry against marihuana use prior to the passage 
of the Act, his data supporting this argument are misleading 
if not erroneously interpreted. 3 3  While marihuana use seems to 
32. This is not unusual in the area of moral legislation, as 
Becker points out. Furthermore, unlike non-criminal legis- 
lation where the losing party still has a variety of 
remedies available to challenge the law, few remedies are 
available to those who are legislated against in criminal 
areas. Legitimate lobbies cannot be formed, and test cases 
are dangerous. 
However, Becker gives the impression that the only opposi- 
tion to the marihuana legislation came from hemp growers, 
and that no one argued for the marihuana users (Outsiders, 
pp. 144-145). This is erroneous, The legislative counsel 
for the A.M.A., Dr. William C. Woodward, challenged the 
Bureau's conclusions that marihuana use was harmful to 
health and widespread among children, and demanded evidence 
to support these assertions. While he was not representing 
the marihuana users, he was certainly arguing their case 
and questioning the need for the legislation. See Taxation 
of Marihuana (Hearings Before the Committee on Ways and 
Means of the House of Representatives, 75th Congress, 1st 
Session, on H.R. 6385, April 27-30 and May 4, 1937, 
especially p. 92). It should be noted that this opposition 
was ignored by the committee members. 
33. Becker's data consist of a survey of the Readers Guide to 
Periodical Literature, in which he found that no magazine 
articles appeared before July, 1935; four appeared between 
July, 1935 and June, 1937; and seventeen between July, 1937 
and June, 1939 (Outsiders, p. 141). While this is correct, 
the four articles in the second period all appeared before 
1937, no articles appeared in the five months preceding 
the House Ways and Means Committee hearings on the act, in 
late April and early May, one appeared in July, 1937 and 
the rest appeared after the bill was signed into law on 
August 2, 1937. In short, of the articles which Becker 
asserts provided the impetus to Congressional action, only 
one appeared in the seven months of 1937 before the mari- 
huana bill was signed into law, 
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. 
to have increased since the early 1930's; there appears to have 
been little public concern expressed in the news media,'even 
in 1937. Few magazine articles were written about the subject, 
and if the New York-Times is any indication, newspaper coverage 
was also slight., 34 The final presidential signing of the ac,t. 
/' 
received minimal coverage from the Times, 35 In short, rather 
than the,Bureau-generated public turmoil that Becker indicates, 
it seems that,public awareness of the problem, as well as public 
opposition to it, was slight. 
While it cannot.be shown conclusively that the Marihuana 
Tax Act was the result of a bureaucratic response to environmental 
conditions, similarities between this period and the post- 
Harrison Act period are evident. Marihuana opposition, like 
narcotics opposi,tion before, appears to have been a weakly held 
value. In both, situations, publicity campaigns were launched. 
In both cases,'one through the courts and one through Congress., 
efforts were exerted to expand the power of the Bureau. In both 
34. ; A survey of the New York Times Index shows:. one ar,ticle 
discussed marihuana in 1936 and eight discussed the 
subject in 1937 up to August third. There were no arti- 
cles about or coverage of any of the Congressional hear- 
ings. Contrary-to Becker's assertion, perhaps the most 
significant thing about this period was the lack of 
publicity involved. 
35. .The total coverage -by the New York Times consisted 0f.a 
four li.ne AP dispatch near the bottom of-.page four, 
titled "Signs Bill to Curb Marihuana" and.reading in its 
entirety: "President Roosevelt.signed today a bill to 
curb traffic in the narcotic, marihuana, through heavy 
taxes ' on transactions. " (August 3, 1937) . 
cases.there were substantial numbers of potential criminals 
which could be incorporated into the Bureau's jurisdiction. 
Perhaps more convincing,than .similarities are the.budget- 
ary appropriations for the Bureau from 1915 -to 1944 presented 
in Table I. For easier comparison, these data for a twenty 
year period from 1920 when the Narcotics Division became part 
of the Prohibition Division of the Treasury Department to 1939 
are presented in Figure I. In 1932, when .the Bureau's appro- 
priations were approaching an all time high, the Bureau stated: 
The present constitutional limitations would 
seem to require control measures directed against 
the intrastate traffic of Indian hemp (marihuana). 
to be adopted by the several State governments 
rather than by the Federal Government, and the 
policy has been to urge the State authorities 
generally to provide the necessary legislation, 
with supporting enforcement activity, to prohi.bit 
the traffic except for bona fide medical purposes. 
The proposed uniform State narcotic law,..with 
optional text applying to restriction of traffic 
in Indian hemp, has been recommended as an adequate 
law,to accomplish the desired purpose. 36 
At that time, according to the Bureau, sixteen states had 
enacted legislation in which "the sale of possession (of 
marihuana) is prohibited except for medical purposes. 11 37 BY 
1936, it appears that the Bureau" policy had succeeded, for, . 
as Table I1 shows, all forty eight states had enacted legisla- 
tion which governed the sale of possession of marihuana. 
36. U.S. Bureau of.Narcotics, Traffic in Opium and Other 
Dangerous Drugs For the Year Ending December 31, ,1932, 
Washington: Government Printing Office, .p. 43. 
37. Ibid., p. 43. 
Table I 
Budgetary Appropriations for the U.S. Narcotics Bureau 
Year** Total Appropriation 
*Source: Appropriations Committee, U.S. Senate, Appropriationsi 
New Offices, etc., Statements Showing Appropriations Made, New 
Offices Created, etc., 1915-1923; U.S. Bureau of the Budget, 
The Budget of the United'states ~overnment, Washington: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1923-1945. 
**Fiscal year the appropriation was made. Each sum was-appro- 
priated for the following fiscal-year. 
Figure I 
Budgqtary Appropriations (1920-1939) * 
Fis-cal Year of Appropriation 
*Source: See Table I, p. 24. 
Table .I1 
States Enacting Legislation 
. - 
Controlling Sale or Possession of Marihuana (1932-1936) 38 
Year Number of States 
Despite the fact that this policy had succeeded and despite 
former questions of the constitutionality of the measure, the 
Bureau in 1.937 pressed for the enactment of the federal marihuana 
act. For Anslinger the moral entrepreneur, 1936 should have been 
a year of victory: in every state the marihuana menace was 
subjected to statutory control. 39 But for Anslinger the bureau- 
crat, 1936 seems to have been another year of defeat. His budget- 
ary appropriation remained near a low point that had not been seen 
in over a decade, which to some extent reflected the general 
economic conditions of the time. His request for fiscal 1933 
38. U.S. Bureau of Narcotics, Traffic in Opium and 0ther.Danger- 
ous Drugs..., Washington, Government Printing Office, 1932- 
1936. 
39. While it can be argued that a federal measure was still 
necessary because 1) state legislation was poorly drawn or 
2) state enforcement was inadequate, the former is doubtful 
since by 1937, thirty-nine states (as compared to four in 
1933) had enacted the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, the very 
legislation the Bureau felt would best control marihuana 
use, and the latter situation, even if true, could have been 
rectified by means other than federal legislation. 
had been cut $100,000 below the general Treasury Department 
reduction for all bureaus, 40 In the succeeding years, reductions 
in actual operating expenses were greater than those reflected in 
Table I, -for varying sums were deducted from the appropriations 
and held in a general trust fund as part of the government's 
anti-depression program, The Bureau's actual operating funds 
remained at about one million dollars from fiscal 1934 to fiscal 
1936. 41 in his appearances before the House Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Appropriations that considered the -Treasurey ~ e ~ a r t -  
ment budget, Anslinger repeatedly warned th.at the limited budget 
was curtailing his enforcement activities. 42 By 1936, his budget 
40. Hearings Before t.he Subcommittee of the House Committee on 
Appropriations, 72nd Congress, First Session, in charge of 
the Treasury Department Appropriations sill for 1933, Janu- 
ary 14, 1932, pp. 375-393, 
41. Hearinas Before -the Subcommi-ttee of the House Committee on 
2 
Appropriations, op. cit,, for flscal 1934: 72nd Congress, 
Second Session, ~ovemb-er 23, 1932, pp. 171-180; for fiscal 
1935 : 73rd ~on~ress,. second ~essiok; ,.~ecember- 18, 1933, . 
pp. 178-198; for fiscal 1936: 74th Congress, First Session, 
December 17, .1934, pp. .201-225. .. 
42. Thus in the hearing for the 1935 appropriation: 
Mr. Arnold: "How are you getting by with that $1,000,000 
after those deductions?" 
Comm, Anslinger: "I am getting by, but 1 have had to cut back 
enforcement activities so sharply that it 
has reached a point where I think it has 
been harmful,,." (1935 Hearings, op. cit., 
p. 189) 
In his opening statement at the hearing for the 1936 appro- 
priation, AnsLinger stated: "Mr, Chairman, and distinguished 
members of the committee, during the past fiscal year we have 
been operating under a very restricted appropriation. Our 
enforcement did not fall off too much although it did suffer 
somewhat." (1936 Hearings, op, cit., p. 201) A decrease in 
seizures and fines levied were attributed to the limited 
budget. (Ibid., - pp, 213-214) 
had decreased over $ 4 5 0 , 0 0 0  from its high four.years ago, a fall 
of almost twenty-six per cent. 
Again, in 1937, Anslinger-the moralist would be expected to 
first.convince the general public that marihuana use was evil 
and immoral, while Anslinger the bureaucrat wou.ld be more concern- 
ed with attaining passage of legislation which would increase the 
Bureau's powers and then proceed to generate environmental support 
for these-powers. In fact, the latter occurred. The great bulk 
of bureau-inspired publicity came after the passage of the act, 
not before. 4 3  
Faced with a steadily decreasing budget, the Bureau responded 
as any organization so threatened might react: it tried to appear 
more necessary, and it tried to increase its scope of-operations; 
As a result of this response, the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 was 
passed. 4 4  Whether the Bureau's efforts were entirely successful 
is questionable. One positive result for the Bureau was that 
violations and seizures under the Marihuana Tax Act contributed 
substantially to the Bureau's totals, which had been declining 
for some time. (When arrests, convictions and seizures were on 
the increase, these were faithfully reported to the House Sub- 
committee as evidence of the Bureau's effective use of funds.) 
43.  See footnote 32. 
44 .  While Commissioner Anslinger as leader of this bureaucratic 
response might be characterized as a "bureaucratic entre- 
preneur", such characterization would be mislead.ing, for 
similar to Becker's characterization it still simplifies 
the problem by emphasizing the individual's.importance and 
disregarding that of the bureau and its environment. 
'I) 
In 1938, the first full year under the Marihuana Tax Act, one 
out of every four federal drug and narcotic convictions was for 
a marihuana violation. 45 
However, though the budgetary decline was halted, expected 
increases for enforcing the new legislation did not-immediately 
materialize. Anslinger pointed out this situation in 1937 in 
connection with the fiscal 1939 appropriation: 
Comm. ~nslin~er: We took on the administration of the marihuana 
law and did not get any increase for that pur- 
pose. The way we are running we may have to 
request a deficiency of $100,000 at the end of 
the year; but I sincerely hope you will not see 
me here for a deficit. Beginning the first of 
the year, Mr. Chairman, I shall control all 
travel out of Washington. That is a hard job. 
I have to do that to make up some of this money. 
4 9  We went ahead at high speed and broke up ten 
big distributing rings, and now we find our- 
selves in the hole financially. 
Mr. Ludlow: You have to find some,way to recoup? 
Comm. Anslinger: Yes; and keep the enforcement of the Marihuana 
Act going. Not a dollar has been appropriated 
in connection with enforcement of the Marihuana 
law. We have taken on the work in connection 
with the Marihuana Act in addition to our other 
duties .46 
Whi-le.the Bureau's budgetary appropriations, since that time 
have in general increased, .the period of the late 1930's and 
early 19401s, where increases might be expected to be the largest, 
45. U.S. Bureau of Narcotics. ~raffic i i  
46. Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on 
Appropriations, 75th Congress, Third Session, ,in charge of 
the Treasury Department Appropriations Bill for 1939, 
December 14, ,1937, p. 380. 
"3 
was a period of small advances and then a gradual decline. 47 
Of course the major factor in that period was the massive redirec- 
tion of funds from non-military areas, and thus these figures do 
not accurately reflect the Bureau's enterprise. 
As was pointed.-out at the beginning, this paperdoes .not 
presume-to totally refute Becker's conclus~ons, but ,rather.to 
demonstrate that-an alternative explanation..is equally if not more 
persuasive. The usefulness of this,organizational approach lies in 
that it can be extended to other similar moral crusades or to 
entire social movements, where the emphasis so far has been on the, 
work of certain individual crusaders rather than on the organiza- 
tions themselves. Viewed in this way, whole new ranges of varia- 
bles become evident, and hopefully researchers will be able to 
contribute to as well as draw upon current organizational knowledge. 
.47: See Table I, p. 24. 
